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Abstract
Unverifiable quality may affect the enforcement of procurement contracts even when the award
procedure is able to select the most efficient firm in the market. In this paper, we show that a
discriminatory competitive mechanism – which awards the contract on the basis of price and
(firms’) past performance – yields an efficient allocation of the contract and allows the buyer
to implement her desired quality. Quality enforcement arises out of relational contracting
whereby the buyer ‘handicaps’ a contractor in future competitive tendering processes if it fails
to provide the required quality. We study an infinitely repeated procurement model with two
firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms’ cost, in which, in each period, the
buyer runs a discriminatory auction. We restrict our analysis to the case of a buyer committed
to her handicapping strategy, a case which captures some of the features of a public buyer.
When players use either grim trigger or stick-and-carrot strategies, we find that the buyer
can induce the delivery of optimal (unverifiable) quality with a variety of handicap levels and,
when applicable, durations of the punishment period; for some values of the handicap and the
length of the punishment period, both firms remain active in the market even when punished.
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1 Introduction
Open competition in procurement processes is, in many circumstances, the most appropriate
procedure to ensure the selection of the most efficient contractor. This is true when the quality
of the procured object is endogenous and is verifiable by a third party at a reasonable cost,
since fines can be specified so as to deter the contractor from breaching contract clauses, and
from reneging on promised quality levels.1 There exist cases, though, in which procurement
contracts are characterised by quality dimensions that are observable by contracting parties but
that are hard, if not impossible, to verify. Examples would include IT or management consulting
services, where the quality of human capital is a multidimensional variable comprising unverifiable
dimensions, such as a consultant’s proactiveness or ability to provide innovative solutions. Lack
of verifiability may also affect quality dimensions such as user-friendliness of a software or food
palatability in catering services.
The relevant literature has, thus far, explored two potential solutions to quality non-verifiability
in competitive procedures. The first approach shows that a buyer should avoid using a competitive
procedure to award a procurement contract (Manelli and Vincent, 1995); rather, she should rely
on negotiation-like procedures with a restricted set of highly reputable suppliers.2 Overall, this
approach emphasises that, when quality is not verifiable, there seems to exist a trade-off between
the objectives of efficiency and quality provision: although well-performing in terms of efficiency
(i.e., the ability to procure from the most efficient supplier at the lowest price), competitive pro-
cedures are not able to ensure quality. The latter is best obtained by means of negotiation-like
procedures, which, however may not perform well in terms of efficiency. The second approach
(Klein and Leﬄer, 1982; Board, 2011; Calzolari and Spagnolo, 2013; and Auriol and Søreide,
2015) still relies on the use of competitive procedures, but endows the buyer with an extremely
harsh punishment device when quality is not delivered – she can debar the cheating firm from
the competitive environment. In other words, a cheating firm faces the potential threat of being
unable to submit a bid for the relevant contract in the future.
The paper’s main objective is to prove that there exists a third mechanism that allows the
buyer to elicit soft quality provision in procurement markets. This mechanism takes the form of
a discriminatory scoring auction in which the scoring rule evaluates a firm’s bid and ‘handicap’
based on the firm’s performance in executing the same task in the past.3 When repeated over time,
the interaction between the buyer and the contractor turns out to be an instance of a ‘relational
procurement contract’ (RPC, henceforth), which allows the buyer to select the most efficient
1This conclusion would hold under the assumptions of effective contract management and law enforcement.
2For an empirical analysis, see Bajari et al. (2009), Estache et al. (2009), and Lalive and Schmutzler (2011).
3Discrimination may also take the form of a positive reward, although it may not necessarily depend on firms’ past
performance. For instance, discriminatory mechanisms are applied in favour of small or domestic firms in the US.
Favouritism may be also tuned to the suppliers’ efficiency (see Naegelen and Mougeot, 1998; Branco, 2002; and
Vagstad, 1995). Another form of favouritism is the one of ‘set-asides’ for small and medium-sized firms provided
for by the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation and by procurement regulation in South Africa and China. Positive
discrimination may also take the form of ‘bidding credits’, like the ones used for the regional radio spectrum
auctions in the U.S. in 1993. Ayres and Crampton (1996) show that allowing bidding credits to firms owned by
women and minorities increased both competition among auction participants and the government’s revenue.
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supplier and to obtain the required quality level by using the threat of putting the contractor at
a disadvantage in future tenders, thus reducing its (expected) stream of future profits.4 Since the
handicap may be smoothly fine-tuned, a reputation-enhanced auction is a much more flexible and
politically viable instrument than the draconian punishment of excluding a ‘cheating’ firm from the
bidding market altogether. Also, since it encompasses the case of exclusion of the ‘cheating’ firm,
our model of discriminatory scoring auction allows us to study under what conditions either form
of punishment turns out to be optimal for the buyer.5 Indeed, although we do not explicitly deal
with this issue in the paper, formal exclusion might become detrimental to the level of competition
in future tendering processes if entry in the procurement market is limited. This is often the case
when procurement contracts require specialised know-how and/or sizeable fixed costs for drafting
proposals for designing, say, complex ICT systems or infrastructures.
The competitive mechanism studied in this paper is consistent with the solutions adopted in
some international regulations. In particular, it mimicks the main characteristics of past perfor-
mance evaluation in the U.S. federal regulation on public procurement.6 Indeed the U.S. Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) prescribes that “[p]ast performance should be an important element
of every evaluation and contract award for commercial items” (U.S. General Services Adminis-
tration, 2016, part 12.206). The FAR also provides (federal) agencies with broad discretion in
deciding how they will consider firms’ prior experience – whether the firms have done similar work
before – and past performance – how well they have done that work. In this respect, a 2011 report
by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the use of past performance in awarding
federal contracts emphasises that “in almost all procurements [. . . ] the contracts were awarded to
the offerors that received the highest rating for nonprice factors, such as prior experience or past
performance” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011, p. 2).
To prove our results, we build a dynamic game, resulting from an infinite repetition of a
sequential game with three players: one buyer and two competing firms.7 The buyer competitively
awards a contract for a project whose quality is ex-post observable by trading parties, but not
verifiable. When running the auction, the buyer is uninformed about the firms’ (fixed) cost,
4Long-term relationships are also more likely to emerge in those procurement markets populated by a stable set
of few firms rather than in ones in which firms’ turnover is high. Some procurement markets in which the issue
of unverifiable quality is more prominent, such as those for highly specialised consulting services (i.e., strategy
consulting or ICT consulting), seem to be characterised by this feature.
5To be sure, in our model a harsh handicap does not imply a formal exclusion of the punished firm from the
procurement market, but it results in a de facto debarment: the firm remains active although is put at such a
competitive disadvantage that it cannot outbid its rival and thus be awarded a contract. For ease of exposition,
in the remainder of the paper, we shall use ‘debarment’ only.
6In the EU, instead, discriminatory evaluation criteria may conflict with articles 3 and 87 of the EC Treaty; see
Maasland et al. (2004). Past performance can only be used to exclude a firm from competing for a public contract.
According to article 57.4 of the EU Directive 2014/24/EU: “Contracting authorities may exclude or may be required
by Member States to exclude from participation in a procurement procedure any economic operator in any of the
following situations: [. . . ] (g) where the economic operator has shown significant or persistent deficiencies in the
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract, a prior contract with a contracting entity
or a prior concession contract which led to early termination of that prior contract, damages or other comparable
sanctions”. This means that past performance might be taken into account only as a ‘selection criterion’, that is,
whether or not a firm can submit a tender for a public contract.
7The buyer is referred to as she, while both firms are referred to as it.
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whereas each firm is fully informed of the rival’s cost. The competitive process is (possibly)
discriminatory, in the sense that the buyer awards the project on the basis of the firms’ bids and
of the handicap placed on the firm(s) which delivered a lower-than-desired level of quality in the
past.
We assume the buyer to be able to commit to her strategy, in the sense that she is not able
to deviate from her past performance evaluation strategy along the play of the game. The case
of commitment captures some of the features of a public buyer – say, a central government body
carrying out procurement processes according to an exogenously given regulation which may con-
strain the buyer’s ability to change her evaluation scheme. The FAR provides quite some evidence
of the constraints ‘tying the hands’ of a federal buyer when the latter adopts a past performance
evaluation system. For instance, subpart 42.15 (Contract Performance Information) of the FAR
is aimed mainly at standardising the criteria to be used by federal agencies in evaluating contrac-
tors’ past performance (U.S. General Services Administration, 2016). Moreover, past performance
evaluation criteria need to be clearly stated before tenders are submitted, especially when they
carry a high weight in the overall weighting system.8 This becomes compelling when past perfor-
mance evaluation results in suspension/debarment. Borrowing the words of a 2008 Congressional
report: “[. . . ] debarments are often mandatory, leaving no discretion to contracting officers; are
punishments; and last for a period prescribed by statute, with limited opportunities for agencies
to waive them” (Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 21). To strengthen such a commitment
power, the decision of suspension/debarment is typically taken by another organisational unit that
was not involved in the tenders evaluation procedure.9
We study two versions of the repeated game, one in which players use grim trigger and the
other in which they use stick-and-carrot strategies. While grim trigger strategies, although difficult
to map to reality, are able to clearly pin down the trade-offs between short-run benefits and
long-run costs of a deviation, stick-and-carrot strategies seem more attractive in the analysis
of public procurement, as a public buyer may be unable to use an infinitely long punishment.
Stick-and-carrot strategies are well-suited to capture the features of time-limited punishments for
poor past performance. Evidence about both the exact duration of handicapping schemes and
the exact (time-related) definition of past performance is scant. However, precise information is
available concerning the time-limited nature of harsher forms of punishment, namely suspension
and debarment. Indeed, subpart 9.4 of the FAR establishes accurate policies and procedures
governing suspension and debarment actions related to federal contracts (U.S. General Services
Administration, 2016). A suspension is a temporary exclusion pending the completion of an
investigation or legal proceeding which generally may not last longer than 18 months, while a
8A quite enlightening case is provided by a request for proposals (RFP) issued to procure meals, lodging, and
transportation for newly arrived U.S. Army soldiers. Dietz (2002) emphasises that “[t]he RFP was silent on the
role of any non-price evaluation factor other than past performance. Past performance was set forth in considerable
detail, including how it would be used and what would be considered” (p. 36).
9For instance, according to a 2014 GAO Report, the Department of Veteran Affairs has a Debarment and Suspension
Committee with a staff of about 10 positions that review all referrals for procurement-related suspension and
debarment actions, conduct fact-finding, and present facts and recommendations to the Suspension and Debarring
Official (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014, p. 13).
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debarment is an exclusion for a reasonable, specified period depending on the seriousness of the
cause, but generally should not exceed 3 years.10 Both provisions then limit the time during
which a firm is forbidden to be awarded a public contract, a feature which is in the spirit of
stick-and-carrot strategies.
Equilibria have similar features under the different hypotheses on the players’ strategies. Under
both grim trigger and stick-and-carrot strategies, when players are sufficiently patient, we find
that a self-enforcing pair of RPCs is able to select the efficient supplier and induce it to deliver
the optimal quality level. This holds provided that the handicap the buyer imposes on any firm
which delivered a suboptimal quality level in the past is higher than the contractor’s cost savings
when it fails to deliver quality. Since the handicap is never imposed along the equilibrium path
but only acts as a threat in case of a deviation, the buyer is able to obtain quality without
leaving the contractor with any profits in excess of what it would make in a static competitive
procedure when quality is verifiable. Different levels of the handicap are possible in equilibrium,
thus providing the buyer with quite some room of manoeuvre: with a low handicap, a deviating
firm remains active in the market; when, instead, the handicap is high enough, a deviating firm
is put at such a competitive disadvantage that it cannot outbid its rival. This case gives rise to a
de facto debarment, in that the handicapped firm is not formally excluded from the procurement
market, but no longer has a chance to be awarded a contract.
When grim trigger strategies are in use, and the handicap is sufficiently low that no debarment
occurs in case of a deviation, we find an inverse relationship between the handicap and the lowest
discount factor ensuring cooperation. If, instead, the handicap is sufficiently high that debarment
occurs after a deviation, the critical discount factor does not depend on the handicap level since the
punishment is harsh enough. A similar result is found in the case of players using stick-and-carrot
strategies; when the handicap is sufficiently low and no debarment occurs in case of a deviation,
an inverse relationship between the handicap and the minimal punishment length arises. When
the handicap is high enough so that debarment occurs, this inverse relationship disappears.
The paper is organised as follows. After reviewing the related literature in Section 2, we de-
scribe the model in Section 3. Section 4 analyses the dynamic game, under the different assump-
tions on the players’ strategies. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the large literature studying the enforcement of unverifiable quality in
procurement, first analysed by Lewis and Sappington (1991), Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Che
(1993). While these papers and the ensuing literature look at this issue in the static setup of
incentive and auction theory,11 we set up our analysis in the context of a repeated interaction
10To be sure, both suspension and debarment are also provided for by other public procurement regulations, most
notably the EU procurement regulation (see Directive 2014/24/EU, article 57). In this case too, these punishments
are time-limited.
11See, for instance, Hanazono et al. (2013) and Giebe and Schweinzer (2015).
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between our players, thus investigating relational contracts and the incentives that they create to
provide quality. Relational contracts are informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct that
are sustained by the value of future relationships, and are applicable in cases where the outcome
of a repeated relationship is based on some unverifiable variables.12
Several papers have conducted the analysis of opportunistic behaviour in repeated procurement
in the context of a long-term relationship. Klein and Leﬄer (1981) show that an optimal strategy
for the buyer is to promise a rent to the contractor under the threat of terminating the relationship
in case of opportunistic behaviour. Dalen et al. (2006) study a model in which a third party
provides a quality ranking subject to noise; they show that when the reward for the supplier is
given by a certain probability of the contractual renewal, then the incentive to induce quality is
maximal if 50% of the contracts are renewed. Kim (1998) shows that restricting the number of
admitted participants in a competitive procedure may induce the competitors to provide a high
quality. Doni (2006) introduces unverifiable quality in the competitive multidimensional price-
quality auction of Asker and Cantillon (2008); he shows that a buyer may use a reputational
mechanism based on an index of past performance to induce the contractor to deliver a required
level of unverifiable quality.
A paper closely related to ours is Calzolari and Spagnolo (2013, CS henceforth). This and our
paper share a similar set-up of a repeated game with one buyer and many privately-informed agents
delivering a non-contractible project. In a model which allows an unspecified number of firms in
the market and the possibility of transfers and bonuses, CS show that a firm has the incentive
to deliver quality if the buyer has the power to exclude it from future competitive tendering
procedures in case it fails to deliver quality. When the value of quality or the number of potential
bidders is low, the threat of preventing a firm to participate to future open competitive procedures
after a deviation is sufficient to ensure the provision of quality. When, instead, the value of quality
or the number of potential bidders is high, the buyer finds it optimal to restrict the number of
firms from the beginning to increase the (expected) payoff of firms when delivering quality. The
main difference with our paper is that CS take exclusion as the only possible punishment, whereas
we endow the buyer with a continuum of punishment levels to the deviating firm, which remains
active in the market even after a deviation. This difference in the buyer’s strategy spaces makes
the nature of competition after a firm’s deviation different across the two papers: in CS, after
a deviation, the ‘surviving’ firms remain (ex-ante) symmetric, whereas in our case the use of a
handicap generates asymmetries, even from an ex-ante perspective, between the competing firms.
The different nature of competition is reflected in different firms’ bids and on- and off-equilibrium
payoffs. In CS, a firm’s ‘cooperative’ expected payoff is a decreasing function of the number
of active firms; in our case, it does not depend on the number of active firms (which is always
constant) but depends on the rival’s handicap (if any). Off the equilibrium path, the expected
12Relational contracts have been pioneered by Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and applied in sev-
eral fields: labour market (MacLeod, 2003; Levin, 2003; and Li and Matouschek, 2013), interaction between/within
firms (Baker et al., 2002; and Rayo, 2007), regulation (Cesi et al., 2012) and experimental economics (Fehr and
Schmidt, 2007; and Bigoni et al., 2014).
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payoff after a deviation is always zero in CS, whereas in our paper it is decreasing in the firm’s
handicap and possibly positive. These differences generate different incentives for the players
to stick to the relational procurement contract; thus, across the two papers, while the players’
strategies on the equilibrium path are similar, the characterisations of the equilibria are different.
Furthermore, CS analyse both cases of a committed and an uncommitted buyer (whereas we
look at the case of committed buyer only) and we analyse both cases of infinite and time-limited
punishments (whereas an exclusion is always everlasting in CS).
Board (2011) also studies how restricting the number of agents may help enforce the provision
of unverifiable tasks; he studies a model between a buyer and many suppliers, in which the buyer
may make a costly investment in one of the suppliers, while the supplier can hold up the buyer
by ex-post appropriating the outcome of the relationship. He characterises the optimal relational
contract, which solves the hold-up problem and shows that the buyer may have an incentive to
deal on different terms between insiders (those firms that the buyer has already traded with) and
outsiders.13
Che (2008) provides and reviews solutions to the problem of unverifiable quality, other than
in the context of relational contracts. Among others, Taylor (1993) and Che and Hausch (1999)
introduce an option contract whereby the supplier pays a fee to the buyer, who then may accept
or reject (at no penalty) the provision at a price equal to its desired level of quality. Che and
Gale (2003) show that a buyer may be better off by allowing suppliers to bid on their reward,
as in a standard auction. Other papers, in line with Manelli and Vincent (1995), study the
enforcing power of competitive procedures versus negotiations when quality is unverifiable; Tunca
and Zenios (2006), among the others, study the interaction between a competitive auction and a
relational contract. Buyers procure low-quality products by running a competitive price auction
and high-quality products by means of a relational contract with a single supplier. They find that,
for some values of quality, the use of competitive auctions for low-quality products may ease the
enforcement of relational contracts for high-quality products.14
Our paper is also connected to the literature on scoring auctions in procurement. A number
of papers study the enforcing role of a scoring multidimensional auction when quality is verifiable,
again comparing a scoring auction with a negotiation-like procedure.15 For instance, Asker and
Cantillon (2008, 2010) show that scoring auctions perform better than price-only auctions or
negotiation and may induce a performance similar to that of the optimal mechanism. In our
approach, the unverifiable nature of quality makes it unfeasible to envisage the possibility of firms
also bidding on quality, thus reducing the role of the scoring rule.
13Boudreau et al. (2001) have empirically studied the role of the number of competitors in procurement.
14See, also, Branco (1997), Wang (2000), Kessler and Lu¨lfesmann (2004) and Milgrom (2004). Empirical analyses
provide mixed evidence. Bajari et al. (2009), studying the private-sector building contracts in Northern California
from 1995 to 2000, find that those awarded by negotiation perform better. On the other hand, analysing the
procurement of regional railway services in Germany, Lalive and Schmutzler (2011) find that auctioned lines
provide a higher frequency of service (seen as a proxy for quality) compared to lines awarded by direct negotiations.
15See the references cited in footnote 20.
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3 The model
The players. A public buyer wishes to procure a single project of variable quality q. This pro-
curement activity takes place at time t and it is repeated for an infinite number of periods, so
that t = 0, ...,∞. Two firms, 1 and 2, can compete for the project. At each t, a firm’s cost is
c(θit, qit) = θit + ψ(qit), where i = 1, 2 and t = 0, ...,∞ (we will drop the time subscript when-
ever possible); that is, the total cost for carrying out the contract consists of a fixed firm-specific
component, θi, and of a quality-dependent component, ψ(qi), identical across firms.
16
We assume that the fixed cost parameter for each firm is a random variable with only two
possible realisations, θL and θH , with θL < θH . We denote with ∆θ ≡ θH − θL the largest cost
advantage that one of the two firms may have on the fixed cost component. Both firms face
an identical and time-invariant probability of realisation of θL, which we denote with β, where
β ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, for i = 1, 2 and t = 0, . . . ,∞, Pr(θit = θL) = β.
Quality is always non-negative and can vary over a continuous support, so that q ∈ [0,+∞).
The cost of providing quality, given by ψ(q), is increasing and convex in q and such that ψ(0) = 0.
The value of the project to the buyer is given by v + ν(q), that is, the intrinsic value of the
project plus the value of its quality. By normalising the value of quality so that ν(q) = q, we can
write the utility of the buyer as U(v, q, p) = v+ q− p, where p is the price paid to the contractor.
To focus on situations in which the provision of quality is (socially) beneficial, we assume that
the value of quality is always sufficiently high relatively to its cost; that is, we focus on cases in
which q ≤ q¯, where q¯ is such that q¯ = ψ(q¯). Moreover, v is always sufficiently high to induce
the buyer to procure the project, that is, we assume that the buyer is willing to trade with the
winning firm in any single period, thus ensuring that the buyer’s participation constraint is always
fulfilled. To ensure this, we assume that v ≥ v, where the actual value of v will be discussed later
in the paper as it turns out not to be exogenously dependent on the model’s parameters only.
Conditional on being selected, firm i’s profit is given by pii ≡ pi(p, q) = p− θi − ψ(q). Both firms
have a reservation value equal to 0 and no possibility of making use of the capital markets, so
that a non-negativity constraint holds for them in each period.17 All players are risk-neutral and
have a common discount factor equal to δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1], capturing their time preference and
the uncertainty about the existence of future opportunities of trade.
The competitive tendering and the scoring rule. In each period, the buyer awards the project by
means of a scoring auction. Firms bear no bidding costs.18 Before bids are submitted, the buyer
assigns to each firm a handicap and, once the bids are made, evaluates them in a discriminatory
way, depending on the handicap. More specifically, for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, the competitive
procedure requires the buyer to announce the handicaps to the two firms, hi and hj , and each
firm to submit a bid, denoted as bi and bj . Firms submit mono-dimensional bids, which comprise
16A separable cost function is also used by Asker and Cantillon (2010) and Calzolari and Spagnolo (2013).
17In the context of a repeated procurement market, Arve (2014) studies the case of financially constrained firms.
18In our stylised procurement market, competitors can be easily thought of as big-sized firms for which bidding
costs are of a much lower order of magnitude than the value of the procurement contract.
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only the price dimension, but not the quality to be delivered. This is due to the fact that quality
is non-contractible (as discussed below) and, thus, cannot be part of the submitted tender.19 In
each competitive procedure, the buyer evaluates the bids using a scoring rule S(bi, hi) and awards
the contract to the lowest-score firm. Although bids are mono-dimensional, the scoring rule is
needed to reflect the handicap imposed on the firm: a handicap hi is simply a non-negative real
number to be added to the firm’s bid.20 Formally, firm i’s score is given by S(bi, hi) = bi + hi.
In case of a tie - that is, if S(b1, h1) = S(b2, h2) - we assume that the buyer awards the project
randomly.
Informational structure. We analyse a game of perfect monitoring and incomplete information.
Perfect monitoring relates to the fact that each player can observe the other players’ actions. More
specifically, the firms’ handicaps and bids, the quality provided by the contractor and the final
price are all perfectly observable by all players. Incomplete information relates to the buyer not
knowing the realisation of the firms’ (fixed) cost parameters. Each firm, instead, knows its own
and the rival’s cost. Although perfect monitoring implies that the buyer can fully observe the
contractor’s quality choice, this is not enforceable by a court of law, which implies that the buyer
cannot make the contractual price conditional on the level of quality delivered.
This stylised informational structure allows us to focus on our research questions. The buyer’s
incomplete information on the firms’ costs ensures that she faces two problems simultaneously:
selecting the most efficient firm and inducing it to provide the required quality level. Moreover, full
information between the firms ensures a tractable setting for our repeated competitive tendering
model.21 Finally, thanks to the structure of our repeated game, perfect monitoring between the
two firms is an innocuous assumption: only the handicaps applied to the two firms, rather than
their past choices, matter for their decisions.
The timing of the game. We analyse an infinitely repeated game resulting from an infinite repe-
tition of a sequential stage game. The timing of the stage game is as follows:
stage 1: the buyer sets the desired quality level qi and the handicap hi to each firm i, for i = 1, 2;
22
stage 2 (the bidding stage): firms learn their cost parameters and submit their bids, and the
project is awarded by means of a sealed-bid lowest-score auction;
19If a bid were also to include a quality dimension (and quality were bounded from above), both firms would always
find it optimal to bid the highest possible level of quality, wiping out all the effects of the quality component in
the bids.
20Scoring rules are typically used to evaluate tenders with multiple attributes (say, quality and price). Che (1993)
proves that a scoring auction in which price enters linearly into the scoring rule implements the optimal (buying)
scheme when (firms’) private information is one-dimensional. Asker and Cantillon (2008) extend this result to
the case in which firms’ private information is multidimensional. Our approach is in line with Burguet and Che
(2004), who assume the bid to be only on verifiable elements of the firm’s actions (in their paper, price and
quality) and the scoring rule to reflect a possible discretionary bias of the buyer towards either firm.
21Under some restrictions, we show that assuming imperfect information between the firms does not alter the
qualitative nature of most of our results. Details are omitted and are available from the authors upon request.
22In real procurement markets, the announcement of the desired quality level is normally part of the Terms of
Reference, which describe the main technical characteristics of the project.
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stage 3 (the execution stage): the contractor chooses the quality level and delivers the project.
The buyer pays the contractor a price equal to the contractor’s bid, quality is observed and
payoffs are collected.
4 Equilibrium analysis
We now analyse the game described in the previous section. We start by characterising the optimal
quality level for the buyer. We then analyse the constituent game and show that, in equilibrium,
the buyer is unable to induce the provision of any quality different from 0. We then analyse the
dynamic game under the two alternative assumptions of players using grim trigger and stick-and-
carrot strategies; in both cases, we derive the conditions under which the buyer is able to obtain
the provision of quality.
4.1 Optimal quality
We denote by q∗ the buyer’s optimal quality level. Assuming that firm i completes the project,
q∗ maximises the buyer’s utility v + q − p, subject to a non-negativity constraint on the firm’s
profits – i.e., p−θi−ψ(q) ≥ 0. Then, q∗ is implicitly defined by the condition ∂ψ(q
∗)
∂q∗ = 1, provided
that ψ(q∗) < q∗. This is the standard optimality condition for quality, where marginal cost and
marginal benefit are equated. Notice that, because of the separability in the firms’ cost function,
the optimal quality level is independent of the realisation of the firms’ cost parameters.
4.2 The static game
We turn now to the analysis of the constituent game described in Section 3. It is useful to first
concentrate on the bidding stage. Let q′i and q
′
j be the anticipated quality levels to be offered by
firm i and j at the execution stage, respectively. Also, let ci ≡ c(θi, q′i) and Ci ≡ ci +hi, where Ci
denotes firm i’s ‘perceived’ cost, defined as the sum of the firm’s anticipated cost, given qi, and
its handicap. Then, we can characterise the optimal pair of bids as follows:
Lemma 1. The optimal bids b′i and b
′
j at the bidding stage of the static game are:
i) if Ci < Cj, then b
′
i = cj + (hj −hi) and b′j = cj, and firm i is awarded the contract at a price b′i;
ii) if Ci = Cj, then b
′
i = ci and b
′
j = cj, and the project is randomly awarded to either firm at a
price b′i = b
′
j.
This result implies that, in a static game, firms bid as in a standard, possibly asymmetric,
Bertrand game, where, however, the firms evaluate their relative efficiency taking into account
their ‘perceived’ costs. This is composed of three separate elements: first, the firms’ fixed costs,
θi and θj ; second, the cost of the quality levels that the two firms anticipate to deliver if they
win the competitive tendering, ψ(qi) and ψ(qj); and, finally, the handicaps hi and hj imposed on
the two firms. To illustrate, take the case of firm 1 having a fixed cost lower than the rival. If
both firms anticipate to provide no quality and have a handicap equal to 0, firms 1 bids to exploit
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its competitive advantage. If, instead, firm 1 anticipates to provide some positive quality, when
the quality to be provided (and its cost) is too large relatively to the fixed cost differential (i.e.
ψ(q1) > ∆θ), it is now firm 2 which is able to outbid the rival and profit from its cost advantage. In
the case of no (anticipated) quality, but positive handicaps to both firms, firm 1 enjoys a bidding
advantage provided that h1 − h2 < ∆θ; if the direction of this inequality is reversed, firm 2 has a
lower ‘perceived’ cost, can outbid the rival and win the auction. Notice that, since the handicap
enters the scoring rule linearly, only the difference between the two handicaps is reflected in the
equilibrium bids and then in the buyer’s utility.
Characterising the equilibrium of the game is now a trivial exercise. At the execution stage,
the contractor delivers zero quality. At the bidding stage, firms bid as in Lemma 1, anticipating
that they will deliver no quality. If two firms face different ‘perceived’ costs - that is, if Ci 6= Cj
- then whichever firm enjoys the overall competitive advantage will be awarded the contract at a
price marginally below the opponent’s ‘perceived’ cost, reduced by its own handicap. If the two
firms face the same ‘perceived’ cost, then the contract will be awarded randomly. Since firms’
‘perceived’ cost are increasing in the difference between the handicaps, the buyer optimally sets
the same handicap to both firms and picks any quality level, anticipating that it will not be
delivered. This analysis trivially shows that, in a static setting, firms do not have an incentive to
provide quality.
4.3 The dynamic game
We turn our attention to the dynamic game. In this game, an RPC describes, for any history of
the game, the handicap that the buyer sets to a firm, the bid that this firm submits and the quality
that it chooses, if awarded the contract. A pair of RPCs is self-enforcing if it describes a perfect
equilibrium of the game. This type of game clearly has multiple equilibria.23 We concentrate our
analysis on players adopting the following strategies:
Buyer : for i = 1, 2, the buyer sets hi = h
C
B,i to firm i if: i) firm i delivered quality
equal to qCB,i in all previous periods in which it was awarded the project (if any); or
ii) firm i delivered quality different from qCB,i in some past periods, followed by TB,i
periods in which it offered quality equal to qPB,i when awarded the contract. Otherwise,
the buyer sets hi = h
P
B,i to firm i.
Firm i (i = 1, 2): firm i bids as in Lemma 1 with qi = q
C
i and, if awarded the project,
offers quality qCi if i) hi = h
C
i in the current and all previous periods, or ii) the buyer
sets hi 6= hCi in some past periods, followed by Ti periods in which it sets hi = hPi .
Otherwise, the firm bids as in Lemma 1 with qi = q
P
i and, if awarded the project,
delivers quality qPi .
23Mailath and Samuelson (2006) provide an excellent and comprehensive treatment of repeated games.
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These strategies encompass, for different values of the length of the punishment period, both grim
trigger and stick-and-carrot strategies.
Let sB and si denote the strategy of the buyer and of firm i, respectively. With the unre-
stricted strategy domain implied in the above description, the buyer’s and firm i’s strategies may

























respectively. In the rest of the paper, however, we will focus on the buyer’s strategies whereby
she sets identical ‘cooperative’ and ‘punitive’ handicaps and quality levels to both firms, as well
as an equal length of the punishment period. There are several reasons for focussing on ‘symmet-
ric’ strategies. The first has to do with the fact that a public buyer, even if she has the ability
to impose a handicap based on unverifiable elements of the firms’ performance, should conform
her behaviour to the general principle of ‘equality of treatment’: since the two firms are ex-ante
identical, a buyer’s strategy allowing for, say, different ‘punitive’ handicaps to the two firms would
clearly violate this principle (the same reasoning applies to the other arguments of sB(.)). More-
over, the hypothesis that our buyer requires the same ‘cooperative’ quality level to both firms is
in line with our focus on the buyer’s ability to induce the provision of the optimal quality level,
which is identical across firms. A more fundamental reason for focussing on ‘symmetric’ strategies
is related to the effect of the handicap on the buyer’s utility and the sustainability of cooperation.
In the discussion following Lemma 1 we emphasised that the buyer’s utility is decreasing in the
difference between the firms’ handicaps; hence, along the equilibrium path of the game, the buyer
strictly prefers those equilibria in which firms have symmetric ‘cooperative’ handicaps. Such an
argument cannot, in principle, be applied to ‘punitive’ handicaps; these are not applied on the
equilibrium path and therefore do not enter the buyer’s utility. However, symmetric ‘punitive’
handicaps make an equilibrium easier to sustain, that is, they (weakly) enlarge the range of the
discount factor ensuring its existence.24













i , Ti), for i = 1, 2, (1)
where we also drop the relationship to hCB and h
C
i which, w.l.o.g., we normalise to 0.
In the rest of the analysis, we assume that the buyer is committed to her strategy, that is,
she cannot modify her punishment strategy during the play of the game. This implies that a pair
of RPCs is self-enforcing when firms’ strategies are part of of subgame perfect equilibrium of the
repeated game given the buyer’s strategy.25
24The intuition for this comes from the initial consideration that a firm’s handicap negatively affects its critical
discount factor via the effect on its continuation payoff after a deviation. Start from a situation in which neither
firm has deviated in the past and both are threatened to be applied the same handicap in case of a deviation;
decreasing marginally the ‘punitive’ handicap to one firm only pushes up the critical discount factor of this firm,
making in turn cooperation more difficult to sustain.
25This is an extreme form of commitment; other weaker forms of commitment are, in principle, possible. For
instance, one could envisage a buyer who commits to the level of the handicap or the length of the punishment
period, but who can nonetheless deviate from her strategy by applying these punishments even on the absence of
a deviation or not applying these punishments in case of a deviation. For any, however mild, departure from the
assumption of full commitment, a pair of RPCs would be self-enforcing when the firms’ and the buyer’s strategies
11
4.3.1 Grim trigger strategies
We start our analysis of the dynamic game by looking at the case of players using an infinitely long
punishment when another player deviates. Formally, in the strategies described in the previous
section, this simply accounts for deleting items ii) in the specification of the buyer’s and firms’
strategies or, equivalently, setting TB = Ti =∞.
In studying the game, we need to take into account that players may deviate from their
strategies in many different ways. The possibility of the buyer deviating from her strategy is
precluded by the hypothesis of commitment. Firms, instead, may deviate in two ways. First, the
firm awarded the contract may decide to deliver at the execution stage a quality different from
the one prescribed by its strategy si(.). Notice that, since the project has a fixed nature and
quality is costly, a firm does not gain from offering a positive quality level, with the exception of
the long-term gains when it offers the ‘cooperative’ quality. As a consequence, a firm that chooses
to deviate at the execution stage will always provide quality equal to 0. This, in turn, implies
that, despite the continuous range over which quality may be chosen, the only quality levels that
a firm can profitably choose are either the one required by the buyer or 0. The second possible
type of deviation may occur at the bidding stage: anticipating that it will cheat on quality if it is
awarded the contract, a firm may bid aggressively, making a bid that does not include the cost of
quality.
Formally, the attention to grim trigger strategies and to the case of a committed buyer implies
that, when referring to the buyer’s strategy in (1), we can drop the functional relationship to qPB
and TB. This is because TB is always set equal to ∞, and, since this strategy is unforgiving,
there is no quality level that the buyer can prescribe during the punishment phase to terminate




B). Also, when referring to the
firms’ strategy in (1), we can simply write si(q
C





and Ti: indeed, the assumption of a committed buyer implies that we need not characterise the
punishment phase by the firm.




ψ(q∗) + β(1− β) min {h◦ − ψ(q∗),∆θ} . (2)
Then, for any h◦ ≥ ψ(q∗), and provided that δ ≥ δ(ψ(q∗)), the strategy profile sB(h◦, q∗) and
si(q
∗) (for i = 1, 2) defines a pair of self-enforcing RPCs whereby the project is awarded in each
period to the most efficient firm, which delivers quality q∗.
In each period, the buyer’s expected utility is u = v+ q∗−ψ(q∗)− θH +β2∆θ, and the expected
value of firm i’s profits is Epii = β(1− β)∆θ, with i = 1, 2.
are part of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
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The Proposition illustrates that a pair of RPCs with a sufficiently high handicap is able to
induce the provision of the optimal quality level, provided that the firms value the future high
enough.26 This result is illustrated in Figure 1, where the grey area shows the combinations of
discount factor and handicap under which an equilibrium exists. The intuition for this result
is fairly simple. Each firm knows that, when winning the competitive tendering and providing
quality, it can make profits whenever nature makes it the most efficient firm. When, instead, a
winning firm does not provide quality, the handicap puts it at a disadvantage relative to its rival
in future repetitions of the game, reducing the stream of future profits; the higher the handicap,
the larger the loss of future profits. Hence, for a given gain from a deviation due to current savings
in the cost of quality, a high enough handicap can make the future value of cooperation larger
than the future value of a deviation from the relational contract.27
While relegating the details of the proof to the Appendix, we provide here the main logical
steps when h◦ > ψ(q∗) + ∆θ, that is, in the case when either firm, if handicapped, will never have
a chance to win any competitive tendering in future repetitions of the game (debarment). Given
the buyer’s strategy, consider firm i’s problem (i = 1, 2) at time t = 0 whether or not to adhere
to the ‘cooperative’ strategy, given that firm j sticks to its ‘cooperative’ strategy. In each period,












i , respectively) are the current profits that firm i makes when sticking to (deviating






i , respectively) are the expected single-period profits that it
makes from the next period onwards when sticking to (being punished after a deviation from)
strategy si(q
C










Notice first that EpiCi = β(1 − β)∆θ, namely the value of the profit in an asymmetric Bertrand
game times the probability that firm i is the low-cost firm, while firm j is the high-cost firm, is
identical for all possible realisations of the cost parameters. Second, EpiPi is simply 0 due to the
buyer’s commitment to punish any deviation from the cooperative path with a handicap large
enough so that a deviating firm will not be able to win any contract in the future. Consequently,
the most stringent value of the discount factor for cooperation to be sustainable is obtained by
solving for the highest possible value of the difference (piDi − piCi ), namely the static net gain from
26These conditions are necessary and sufficient for a pair of self-enforcing RPCs, given our restriction to the strategies
described at the beginning of Section 4.3. The same applies to the result given in Proposition 2.
27In a different context, Cesi et al. (2012) show that relational contracting induces optimal unverifiable quality
by a regulated firm. The authors study a regulatory relational contract between a fully informed regulator and
a monopolistic supplier whose quality is unverifiable. The regulator may induce the firm to deliver the socially
efficient quality by allowing prices above the Ramsey level, so that a positive rent is left to the firm, as long as
the required quality is produced.
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a deviation, across all possible realisations of the firms’ cost parameters. It can be shown that
this value is at most equal to ψ(q∗), which coincides with the value of savings from not delivering
quality at the execution stage. Thus the critical threshold in (3) becomes ψ(q
∗)
ψ(q∗)+β(1−β)∆θ as in (2).
If ψ(q∗) < h◦ < ψ(q∗) + ∆θ, during the play of the subgame unfolding after a deviation, the
deviating firm may in principle be able to win a contract depending on the cost configurations
and the other firm’s strategy whether or not to deliver quality. This implies that EpiPi will be
different from 0. However, the proof shows that the condition to hold is still the one in (3), since
the critical discount factor ensuring that a non-deviating firm will optimally cooperate in the
subgame unfolding after the rival’s deviation is always lower than the critical discount factor at
the beginning of the whole game when neither firm is handicapped.
A noticeable feature of our equilibrium is that the handicap plays a role only off the equilibrium
path. The first consequence is that, in equilibrium, firms only bid according to their costs. Hence,
the buyer is able to obtain quality without leaving any extra rent to the firms – that is, any profits
in excess of what they would make in a static competitive tendering when quality is verifiable.
Second, there exists in principle a continuum of values of the handicap supporting an equilibrium.
In particular, the buyer is able to obtain her desired quality without necessarily threatening
to debar a deviating firm from the market. Indeed, the deviating firm is debarred only when
h◦ > ψ(q∗) + ∆θ, as shown in region B in Figure 1.28 When, instead, the handicap is not so high,
as in region A in Figure 1, the deviating firm suffers from a milder punishment, which allows it
to be awarded the project when that firm is more efficient than its competitor.
A third consequence is that the buyer’s utility remains constant among all possible equilibrium
values of the handicap, so that she can achieve the same level of expected utility by resorting to
quite a large set of handicap levels. In other words, since the buyer always prefers the cooperative
equilibrium to the situation in which no quality is provided, all the equilibrium values of h◦ are
equally optimal. Thus, our model, as it stands, cannot then address the issue of the buyer’s
selection criterion of the (equilibrium) handicap level; different levels of the handicap (above
a given threshold) only make the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium more or less
stringent, in that a high (low, respectively) handicap enlarges (reduces) the range of values of the
discount factors which make cooperation possible. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that
if our model were extended to take into account some additional features, it would emerge the
preference of the buyer towards lower levels of the handicap. If our model included the possibility
of an imperfectly observable or stochastic quality or of a ‘tremble’ in the players’ choice of action,
the punitive phase (and the handicap level) would begin to play a role in the equilibrium buyer’s
utility. In these cases, if an equilibrium were to exist, then our conjecture is that it should imply
28Consistently with our assumption of no bidding costs, we assume that a firm with a large handicap (say, firm
j) keeps participating in the competitive tendering even if it can never outbid the rival. Alternatively, we could
assume that firm j refrains from bidding, although standing ready to participate in the auction if there are
profitable opportunities. In this case, firm i’s optimal bid would be such that it makes firm j indifferent between
staying out and entering the auction; however, this bid is identical to the one that firm i would make if firm j
decided to bid. In other words, even if firm j stays out when harshly handicapped, the amount of surplus that
firm i can extract is limited by the threat of firm j being willing to enter and bid when it can profitably undercut
firm i.
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the lowest handicap compatible with the firms’ incentive to play cooperatively. This is because,
whenever ψ(q) ≤ h◦ (as required in equilibrium in our model), it is easy to show that ∂EU(.)∂h < 0
when one firm only is punished and ∂EU(.)∂h = 0 when both are punished. The reason for this
result is quite simple: a larger handicap typically increases the asymmetry between the firms,
thus allowing the contractor a larger rent.
Two additional features of our equilibrium stand out. First, all combinations of the handicap
and the discount factor that meet the conditions stated in Proposition 1 are able to sustain an
equilibrium; this implies that, if we interpret the discount factor as a parameter depending on
the frequency of interactions – which is one of the buyer’s decisions in real procurement markets
– the buyer has the ability to substitute between the two instruments of the handicap and the
frequency of interactions. This result is rather standard in the repeated game literature (see
Shapiro, 1983, but also, more recently, Iossa and Rey, 2014). Notice, however, that in our model,
since neither firm is ever handicapped along the equilibrium path, the buyer does not have an
incentive to exploit this substitutability. Second, the level of the handicap able to induce the
delivery of quality is unrelated to the utility derived from quality and depends on the firms’ costs
only. In other words, for a handicap to be effective in inducing the delivery of quality, it must
be set not in relation to the buyer’s loss of utility due to the lower quality level, but to the effect
that the handicap has on the firms’ incentives.29
The main features of the RPC just discussed allow us to pin down the value of v, that is, the
minimum intrinsic value of the project. This condition on v ensures that the buyer always prefers
to procure the object. Clearly, it must hold not only on the equilibrium path, when neither firm is
handicapped, but also off the equilibrium path, when at least one of the two firms is handicapped.
Since the cost of the project to the buyer increases proportionally with the degree of asymmetry
between firms, the condition on v must be determined when the degree of asymmetry is the
largest, something which occurs when only one of the two firms is handicapped. In this situation,
the handicap imposed to one firm is also a measure of the (potentially additional) competitive
advantage, and therefore of the rent, to its rival. Therefore, we conclude that v ≥ v ≡ θH +h◦; the
first term in v measures either firm’s most unfavourable fixed cost and the second term captures
the rent. Therefore, this value of v sets out the most unfavourable market conditions and ensures
that the buyer is willing to procure the project in any period.
4.3.2 Stick-and-carrot strategies
Grim trigger strategies entail an everlasting punishment, which may not be fully convincing in
public procurement, as a public buyer may not be willing to renounce her desired quality forever.
Stick-and-carrot strategies are, instead, forgiving and, thus, more palatable since they allow for a
punishment of limited length. In this section, we assume that players use stick-and-carrot strate-
29It is possible to show that an identical result could be obtained if we had assumed different tie-breaking rules,
under which, in case of a tie in the firms’ scores, the project would be awarded to the lowest bid or, alternatively,
to the firm with the lowest handicap. The same applies to Proposition 2.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium combinations of handicap and discount factor with grim trigger strategies
(when β = 0.5, ψ(q∗) = 1 and ∆θ = 6)
.
gies: any deviating player is punished for a limited number of periods, provided that it maintains
an appropriate behaviour during this punishment phase. When referring to these strategies, we






B , TB) – where, unlike what we did
in the previous section, we maintain the functional relationship to the variables characterising the
time-limited punishment phase. Regarding firm i’s strategy, as in the previous section, we write
it as si(q
C
i ); as already stated in Section 4.3.1, our assumption of a committed buyer implies that
we need not characterise the punishment phase by the firm.
In the rest of this subsection, we concentrate on the case of the discount factor arbitrarily close
to 1. This simplifies the technical analysis and is less restrictive than it appears: if an equilibrium
exists when δ → 1, by continuity, there always exists a critical discount factor sufficiently close to
1, but strictly smaller than 1, such that a self-enforcing pair of RPCs exists.30 Also, we restrict our
analysis to the case in which, during the punishment phase, the buyer’s stick-and-carrot strategy
entails a quality level equal to 0 (i.e., qPB = 0), so that the quality level required after a deviation
is lower than in equilibrium.31 We can now state the main result of this section.




β(1− β) min{h◦ − ψ(q∗),∆θ} , 1
}
.
30To provide further support to this approach, we explicitly derive the values of the critical discount factor which
ensure the existence of an equilibrium for specific values of TB . This analysis confirms that, under rather mild
parametric conditions, the critical discount factors are strictly smaller than 1.
31Other punishments are, in principle, possible. For instance, a continuity argument might be used to argue that
a pair of self-enforcing RPCs can be supported by a qPB strictly greater than but sufficiently close to 0. On the
other hand, a very large qPB will necessarily induce a deviation from the punishment phase. This leads to the
conclusion that there exists a maximum level of qPB compatible with the existence of an equilibrium. Assuming
qPB = 0 has the clear advantage of simplifying the analysis of the dynamic game, since no deviation is possible
from the punishment phase.
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Panel A: the case of ψ(q∗) < β(1− β)∆θ Panel B: the case of ψ(q∗) ≥ β(1− β)∆θ
Figure 2: Equilibrium combinations of handicap and punishment length with stick-and-carrot
strategies (when β = 0.5 and ψ(q∗) = 1, and ∆θ = 6 in panel A and ∆θ = 2 in panel B).
Then, provided that h◦ ≥ ψ(q∗) and T ◦ ≥ T , the strategy profile sB(h◦, q∗, 0, T ◦) and si(q∗) (with
i = 1, 2) defines a pair of self-enforcing RPCs whereby the project is awarded in each period to the
most efficient firm, which delivers quality q∗.
In each period, the buyer’s expected utility and the firms’ profits are as in Proposition 1.
The Proposition illustrates that, when firms are close to be infinitely patient, it is possible to
induce the delivery of quality even with a punishment of finite duration, provided that this lasts
long enough. These combinations of handicap and punishment length inducing the delivery of
quality are illustrated by the shaded areas in Figure 2, where panel A relates to the case of low
quality cost (or, equivalently, to the case of a large fixed cost differential) and panel B to the case
of high quality cost (or, equivalently, to the case of a small fixed cost differential).32
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. When the handicap is low, the punishment
length and the handicap are substitutes for each other. The reason is that a low handicap makes
a cheating firm still likely to be awarded the contract again when it is efficient, thus limiting the
extent of its punishment. The punishment becomes effective only when it is long enough; however,
any increase in the handicap allows the buyer to reduce the minimal punishment length, since
it reduces the profits of the cheating firm when it is awarded the contract. When, instead, the
handicap is sufficiently high, the cheating firm is debarred from the market. Since the debarment
is the harshest form of punishment, the minimal punishment length is constant and no longer
depends on the handicap. Thus, the substitutability between the punishment length and the
32As anticipated in footnote 30, when TB = 1, our stick-and-carrot strategies are part of an equilibrium of our
game when δ ≥ δTB=1 ≡ ψ(q
∗)
β(1−β)µ , where µ ≡ min{h◦ − ψ(q∗),∆θ}; when TB = 2, the same applies when
δ ≥ δTB=2 ≡
√
[β(1−β)µ]2+4β (1−β)ψ(q∗)µ−β(1−β)µ
β(1−β)µ . Notice that, as expected, δ(ψ(q
∗)) < δTB=2 < δTB=1, so that
the longer the punishment period the lower the critical discount factor. Details are omitted and available from
the authors upon request.
17
handicap disappears. Finally, notice that, for any given handicap, the (minimal) punishment that
induces cooperation is longer the higher the cost of quality. In other words, the set of equilibrium
combinations of handicap and punishment length in panel B of Figure 1 is strictly contained
by the similar set in panel A. This is simply because, with a high quality cost, each firm has a
higher incentive to deviate and, therefore, needs a longer punishment to be induced to stick to its
cooperative strategy.
5 Conclusions
While advocated in terms of transparency and fairness, competitive procedures in public pro-
curement are blunt in promoting quality provision at the execution stage, when quality is non-
verifiable. In this paper, we have shown that an appropriately designed scoring auction, comprising
both the price dimension and firms’ past performance (through a handicap score), is instrumental
in selecting the efficient supplier and in implementing the buyer’s desired quality level. Most
notably, and unlike the results in the related literature, we have characterised the circumstances
under which a self-enforcing relational contracting does not necessarily exclude any competitor
from the procurement market. By linking past performance to the score in the current competitive
process, a buyer is able to provide contractors with dynamic incentives to provide quality. This
seems to capture the spirit of the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation that deems past performance
an important element of every evaluation and contract award.
Our analysis could be expanded in a number of directions. One, almost compelling, extension
would point towards relaxing the assumption of a fully committed buyer. In section 4.3 we hinted
at one possible way of weakening the full commitment assumption. The case of an uncommitted
buyer also sounds appealing as it would better suit, for instance, a private buyer who is arguably
less constrained than a public buyer. An uncommitted buyer will need to restrict herself to credible
handicapping strategies, that is, both the firms’ strategies and the buyer’s handicapping strategy
need to be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. This requirement does in
fact modify the set of conditions under which a relational contracting equilibrium exists.33
A second extension is driven by weakening the assumption of perfect observability of quality
between trading parties at the execution stage of the procurement contract.34 Assume that the
quality observed by the buyer does not necessarily allow her to infer the contractor’s quality
decision; this may be the result of the buyer just getting a signal, which is imperfectly correlated to
the true quality level, or of the stochastic nature of the quality production process. An immediate
observation is that the imperfect observability of the contractor’s choice makes the cooperative
equilibrium impossible to be sustained by means of grim trigger strategies. An equilibrium is
likely to be sustained, instead, by stick-and-carrot strategies, arguably more appealing in (public)
procurement markets. Under these strategies, our original model delivered a (certain degree of)
33The analysis of the case of an uncommitted buyer is carried out in a earlier version of this work. Details are
available from the authors upon request.
34We are grateful to one of the referees of this journal for raising this point.
18
substitutability between the length and the harshness of the handicap. Imperfect observability
might alter this substitutability in several different ways, potentially depending on the nature of
the firm’s deviation and on the industry environment (as described by the model’s parameters),
and would certainly deserve a dedicated line of research.
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Appendix
We provide here the proofs of all Propositions in the paper. As a presentational device, the proofs illustrate
the existence of an equilibrium at t = 0 and checks for the profitability of a deviation by firm 1; due to
ex-ante symmetry between the firms and the infinitely repeated nature of the game, the same arguments
are valid for both firms at any repetition of the game.
To simplify the notation, we let ψ∗ ≡ ψ(q∗). We denote the four possible combinations of cost param-
eters realisations by LL, HH, LH and HL, where the first letter refers to firm 1’s fixed cost parameter,
while the second letter to firm 2’s one; for instance, we denote by LH the case in which θ1 = θL and
θ2 = θH . Also, we let pi
C
i (h1, h2) (pi
D
i (h1, h2), respectively) be the profits that firm i (with i = 1, 2) makes
if it sticks to (deviate from, respectively) its strategy si(.), where h1 and h2 denote the handicap on firm
1 and 2, respectively. Let also piPi (h1, h2) be the profits that firm i (with i = 1, 2) makes when punished
from a previous deviation from its strategy si(.), where h1 and h2 denote the handicap on firm 1 and 2,
respectively. The operator E denotes the expected value of the firm’s profits, where the expectaction is
taken upon the possible realisations of the cost parameters.
We start by illustrating the optimal single-period best reply for firm i when firm j plays in the same
period as prescribed by its cooperative strategy sj(.); the following Lemma shows that this best reply
depends on the realisation of the firms’ cost parameters, the firms’ handicaps, the quality level and its cost.
Lemma A-1. Consider the static game of Section 4.2. Assume the anticipated quality level for firm j
is q and that firm j bids as in Lemma 1 and, if winning the auction, delivers quality q. Then, for any
hi and hj, and any realisation of the firms’ cost parameters,
i) the best reply for firm i is as follows:
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i.i) if c(θi, q) + hi < c(θj , q) + hj, then firm i bids as in Lemma 1, wins the auction and delivers
quality equal to 0;
i.ii) if c(θj , q)+hj ≤ c(θi, q)+hi and hi−hj < θj−θi+ψ(q), then firm i bids bi = c(θj , q)+hj−hi <
c(θi, q), wins the auction and delivers quality equal to 0;
i.iii) if c(θj , q)+hj ≤ c(θi, q)+hi and hi−hj = θj−θi+ψ(q), then firm i bids bi = c(θj , q)+hj−hi <
c(θi, q), the two firms tie and, if firm i is randomly selected, it delivers quality equal to 0;
i.iv) if c(θj , q) + hj ≤ c(θi, q) + hi and hi − hj > θj − θi + ψ(q), then firm i bids as in Lemma 1
and loses the auction.
ii) Relatively to the case in which firm i’s strategy is identical to the one of firm j, the best reply
described in i) ensures to firm i a gain at most equal to ψ(q).
Proof. i) In case i.i), firm i does not have any incentive to deviate from the bidding strategy described
in Lemma 1. Upon winning, though, it may increase its profit by an amount of ψ(q) by delivering
zero quality. In case i.ii), if firm i bids according to Lemma 1 it would lose the auction thus getting a
payoff equal to 0. It can, instead, profitably bid (slightly below) c(θj , q) + hj − hi, thus winning the
auction, and then delivers quality equal to 0. This would yield a profit at most equal to ψ(q). In case
i.iii), again, if firm i were to bid according to Lemma 1 it would lose the auction and thus gets a payoff
equal to 0. Firm i may lower its bid by an amount equal to ψ(q), which would make it tie with firm
j, and, if selected, it delivers quality equal to 0, thus recovering exactly ψ(q). This strategy also yields
firm i profit equal to 0. Finally, in case i.v) firm i’s competitive disadvantage with respect to firm j is
strictly greater than ψ(q), thus the necessary bid reduction to win the auction cannot be recovered by
delivering quality equal to 0, which implies that firm i bids as in Lemma 1.
ii) The analysis of the four cases in i) shows that firm i’s highest possible gain from deviating from the
strategy prescribed by Lemma 1 is bounded by ψ(q). 
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof analyses separately the possible subgames of our dynamic game.
These subgames are referred to as G(h1, h2), with h1, h2 ≥ 0, where the first (second, respectively) variable
in brackets relates to the handicap imposed on firm 1 (firm 2, respectively). For any h > 0, the subgames
are as follows: i) G(0, 0), when neither firm is handicapped (and the subgame coincides with the whole
game); ii) G(h, 0), when firm 1 deviated in the past and it is applied a strictly positive handicap in future
repetitions of the game, whereas a handicap equal to 0 is applied to the rival firm, and iii) G(h, h), when
both firms deviated in the past and are applied a strictly positive handicap in future repetitions of the
game.
We start by focusing on the subgame G(h, 0). We then make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Consider the subgame G(h◦, 0). Assume that the two firms behave as follows: firm 1 (e.g.,
the one with a positive handicap) always bids as in Lemma 1 with the intention to provide quality equal to
0 and, if awarded the project, provides quality equal to 0, and firm 2 always sticks to its cooperative strategy
s2(.).
This assumption allows us to characterise the firms’ payoff in a subgame that, as we will show, is never
played on the equilibrium path: later in the proof, we will then prove that the behaviour we assume in this
subgame is indeed an equilibrium for any combination of the parameters for which neither firm prefers to
deviate from its cooperative strategy si(.) at t = 0.
At t = 0, the IC constraint for firm 1 can be re-written as
δ ≥ pi
D
1 (0, 0)− piC1 (0, 0)(
piD1 (0, 0)− piC1 (0, 0)
)− (EpiP1 (h◦, 0)− EpiC1 (0, 0)) . (A-1)
In (A-1), the expected profits expressions do not depend on the current realisation of the firms’ cost
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parameters; using standard result on Bertrand game and Assumption 1, for any h we can write
EpiC1 (0, 0) = β (1− β) ∆θ; (A-2)
EpiP1 (h, 0) =
{
0 if ψ∗ + ∆θ ≤ h,
β (1− β) (∆θ + ψ∗ − h) if ψ∗ ≤ h < ψ∗ + ∆θ. (A-3)
The difference in current profits piD1 (0, 0)−piC1 (0, 0) depends, rather, on the current realisation of the firms’
cost parameters. However, since the RHS of inequality (A-1) is increasing in piD1 (0, 0) − piC1 (0, 0), the IC
is verified to always hold when it holds for the largest value of this difference which, from Lemma A-1, is
equal to ψ∗. Hence, using piD1 (0, 0) − piC1 (0, 0) = ψ∗, (A-2) and (A-3) in (A-1), a sufficient condition for




ψ∗+β(1−β)∆θ ≡ δa if ψ∗ + ∆θ ≤ h◦,
ψ∗
ψ∗+β(1−β)(h◦−ψ∗) ≡ δb if ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ψ∗ + ∆θ.
(A-4)
Notice that δa and δb in (A-4) differ only for the term in the denominator which multiplies β(1− β). Also,
δa is derived under the assumption that ψ
∗ + ∆θ ≤ h◦, which implies ∆θ ≤ h◦ − ψ∗; on the other hand,
δb is derived under the assumption that h
◦ < ψ∗ + ∆θ, which implies h◦ − ψ∗ < ∆θ. Hence, we can write










To conclude the proof, it remains to look into Assumption 1. We now show that the conditions on δ
which we showed to ensure that no deviation occurs from the cooperative strategies s1(.) and s2(.) under
Assumption 1 are also sufficient to ensure that, in the subgame of interest in Assumption 1, the firms’
behaviour illustrated in the Assumption is indeed an equilibrium behaviour.
As an intermediate step, we focus on subgame G(h, h), that is on the subgame which develops after
both firms deviated in the past.
Lemma A-2. Consider the subgame G(h, h). For any h > 0, there exists an equilibrium in which both
firms bid as in Lemma 1 with qi = qj = 0 and, if awarded the project, provide quality equal to 0.
Proof. Trivial, by noting that both firms are handicapped because of their previous deviations, and
do not have any incentive to provide quality and include its cost in their bids. 
Lemma A-2 establishes that, after both firms deviated in the some past periods, the firms’ equilibrium
behaviour is with both firms behaving as in the static game. Next, we compare the critical discount factors
in subgames G(h, 0) and G(0, 0) when h = h◦.
Lemma A-3. Consider the subgame G(0, 0) and let δ(0, 0) be the discount factor threshold which
ensures the existence of an equilibrium in which both firms i and j behave as prescribed by their strategies
si(.) and sj(.). Consider also the subgame G(h
◦, 0) and let δ(h◦, 0) be the discount factor threshold
which ensures the existence of an equilibrium in which firm i bids as in Lemma 1 with qi = 0 and,
if awarded the project, provides quality equal to 0, and firm j behaves as prescribed by sj(.). Then,
δ(0, 0) ≥ δ(h◦, 0).
Proof. Consider period 1. In subgame G(h◦, 0), firm 1 always behaves as described in Lemma A-1.




◦, 0)− piC2 (h◦, 0)
piD2 (h
◦, 0)− piC2 (h◦, 0)) +
[
EpiC2 (h
◦, 0)− EpiP2 (h◦, h◦)
] ≡ δ(h◦, 0). (A-5)
Let δ(0, 0) be the critical discount factor which ensures that firm 1’s IC constraint in period 1 holds;
in other words, let δ(0, 0) be equal to the RHS of inequality (A-1).





◦, 0)− EpiP2 (h◦, h◦)








EpiC1 (0, 0)− EpiP1 (h◦, 0)
]} ; (A-6)
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where ∆pi1(0, 0) ≡ piD1 (0, 0)− piC1 (0, 0) and ∆pi2(h◦, 0) ≡ piD2 (h◦, 0)− piC2 (h◦, 0). Since the denominator
of D is always positive, then D > 0 if and only if the numerator of D, which we will denote with N , is
also positive. Rearranging N ,
N = N ′∆pi1(0, 0) +N ′′
[
EpiC1 (0, 0)− EpiP1 (h◦, 0)
]
where N ′ ≡ [EpiC2 (h◦, 0)− EpiP2 (h◦, h◦)]−[EpiC1 (0, 0)− EpiP1 (h◦, 0)] and N ′′ ≡ ∆pi1(0, 0)−∆pi2(h◦, 0).
Since all the other terms in N are clearly positive, if N ′ and N ′′ are positive, then N and D are also
positive.
From Lemma A-1, N ′′ ≥ 0. As to N ′, first note that, from standard results on Bertrand games, for
any h, EpiP2 (h, h) = Epi
C
1 (0, 0) = β(1− β)∆θ and
EpiC2 (h, 0) =
{
h− ψ(q) if ψ(q) + ∆θ ≤ h,
(1− β(1− β))(h− ψ(q)) + β(1− β)∆θ if ψ(q) ≤ h < ψ(q) + ∆θ. (A-7)
When ψ(q) + ∆θ ≤ h◦, from (A-3) and (A-7), then N ′ = h◦ − ψ(q) − 2β (1− β) ∆θ > 0. When
ψ(q) ≤ h◦ < ψ(q) + ∆θ, from (A-3) and (A-7), then N ′ = h◦ − ψ(q) ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Assuming firm 2 sticks to its ‘cooperative’ strategy s2(.), the IC constraint for
firm 1 can be written as follows:
piC1 (0, 0) +
∞∑
t=1
δtEpiC1 (0, 0) ≥ piD1 (0, 0) + δΠP1 (h◦, 0), (A-8)
where ΠP1 (h
◦, 0) is the present value of firm 1’s future profits during and after the punishment triggered
by its deviation, when no previous deviation has occurred and no further deviation occurs during the
T ◦ periods of punishment so that, after this phase, the ‘cooperative’ profits are re-established. Letting
piP1 (h
◦, 0) be the profits that firm 1 makes if, during the punishment phase, does not deviate from the









δtEpiC1 (0, 0). (A-9)
Notice that, since we restrict our attention to qPB = 0, we need not worry about a deviation by firm 1 during
the punishment phase.
We need to check now the conditions under which firm 2 sticks to its cooperative strategy. In the game





















δtEpiC2 (0, 0). (A-11)
In (A-10), the LHS is the discounted value of firm 2’s profits when it sticks to its strategy s2(.). The first
term is the value of the current profits, while the second is the discounted sum, over the next T ◦−1 periods,
of its ‘cooperative’ profits. The third term is the discounted value of firm 2’s ‘cooperative’ profits once
the handicap to its rival has been reset to 0 at the end of its punishment phase. The RHS is instead the
discounted value of firm 2’s profits when it deviates from its strategy s2(.). It features Π
′P
2 which is defined
in (A-11) and it is the the present value of firm 2’s future profits during and after a phase of punishment
for its deviation, when it does not deviate during the T ◦ periods of punishment. In Π′P2 , the first sum
relates to the first T ◦ − 1 periods of punishment of firm 2, in which both firms are punished. The second
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term, instead, refers to the next T ◦-th period, in which firm 2 is punished whereas firm 1’s punishment has
just ended; the last sum is the present value of the cooperative profits, when the punishment has ended for
both firms. As in the discussion referring to firm 1, since we restrict our attention to qPB = 0, we need not
worry about a deviation by firm 2 during the punishment phase.
When δ → 1, (A-8) and (A-10) become
T ◦ ≥ pi
D
1 (0, 0)− piC1 (0, 0)
EpiC1 (0, 0)− EpiP1 (h◦, 0)
(A-12)
and
T ◦ ≥ 1 + pi
D
2 (h
◦, 0)− piC2 (h◦, 0) + EpiP2 (0, h◦)− EpiC2 (0, 0)
EpiC2 (h
◦, 0)− EpiP2 (h◦, h◦)
(A-13)
which, when holding together, ensure that both firms do not have an incentive to deviate from their
cooperative strategies.
The RHS of (A-12) is increasing in the difference in current profits, piD1 (0, 0)−piC1 (0, 0), which depends on
the current realisation of the firms’ cost parameters. Hence, (A-12) is verified to always hold when it holds
for the largest value of this difference, which by Lemma A-1, is ψ∗. Therefore, using piD1 (0, 0)−piC1 (0, 0) = ψ∗,
(A-12) is a sufficient condition for the IC of firm 1 to hold. An identical argument can be used for inequality
(A-13). On the other hand, for inequalities (A-12) and (A-13), the expected profits expressions do not
depend on the current realisation of the firms’ cost parameters, but depend on the level of the handicap.
Hence, we need to check which conditions ensure they hold, for the different values of the handicap.
Case 1: ∆θ+ψ∗ ≤ h◦. For firm 1, using (A-2) and (A-3), inequality (A-12) becomes T ◦ ≥ T a1 ≡ ψ
∗
β(1−β)∆θ .
For firm 2, by applying symmetry in (A-2) and (A-3), for any h, EpiC2 (0, 0) = Epi
C
2 (h, h) = Epi
C
1 (0, 0) and
EpiP2 (0, h) = Epi
P
1 (h, 0). Using these and (A-7), inequality (A-13) becomes T
◦ ≥ T a2 ≡ 1+ ψ
∗−β(1−β)∆θ
h◦−ψ∗−β(1−β)∆θ .
When ψ∗ ≥ β (1− β) ∆θ, since T a1 ≥ T a2 , neither firm has an incentive to deviate when T ◦ ≥ T a1 ≥ 1.
When, instead, ψ∗ < β (1− β) ∆θ, since T a1 < T a2 , neither firm has an incentive to deviate when T ◦ ≥ T a2 ;
however, T a2 < 1, which is the shortest admissible punishment length.
Case 2: ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ∆θ + ψ∗: for firm 1, using (A-2) and (A-3), inequality (A-12) becomes T ◦ ≥ T b1 ≡
ψ∗
β(1−β)(h◦−ψ∗) . For firm 2, by applying symmetry in (A-2) and (A-3), for any h, Epi
C
2 (0, 0) = Epi
C
2 (h, h) =
EpiC1 (0, 0) and Epi
P
2 (0, h) = Epi
P
1 (h, 0). Using these and (A-7), inequality (A-13) becomes T




When ψ∗ ≥ β(1 − β)∆θ, since ∂(T b1−T b2 )∂h◦ < 0 and limh◦→(ψ∗+∆θ)−(T b1 − T b2 ) > 0, then T b1 ≥ T b2 , and
neither firm has an incentive to deviate when T ◦ ≥ T b1 ≥ 1. If, instead, ψ∗ < β(1 − β)∆θ we have to
consider two subcases: a) if h◦ ≤ (1−β(1−β))ψ∗β(1−β) , since T b1 ≥ T b2 , neither firm has an incentive to deviate
when T ◦ ≥ T b1 ≥ 1; b) if h◦ > (1−β(1−β))ψ
∗




2 , neither firm has an incentive to deviate when
T ◦ ≥ T b2 ; however, T b2 < 1, which is the shortest admissible punishment length.
Case 3: ψ∗ = h◦. Inequalities (A-12) and (A-13) become T ◦ ≥ ∞. 
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Appendix B (for the use of referees only)
In this Appendix, we provide some additional material and results, not to be published and for
the use of referees only.
B-1 Static procurement game
We provide here full details of the relevant static procurement game which are instrumental to
derive the firms’ payoffs in (A-2), (A-3) and (A-7). The proofs of the following Lemmata are a
simple application of standard results on (possibly) asymmetric Bertrand games, and are omitted.
Lemma B-1. Assume h1 = h2 = h ≥ 0; assume also that firms 1 and 2 both bid anticipating to
deliver quality q1 and q2, respectively, with q1 = q2 = q ≥ 0. Then
i) when LH (or HL, after inverting the identity of the firms), optimal bids and scores are b1 =
b2 = θH + ψ(q), so that scores are S1 = S2 = θH + ψ(q) + h. Firm 1 wins and players’
payoffs are
pi1 = ∆θ; pi2 = 0; u = v + q − θH − ψ(q); (B-1)
iii) when LL (or HH, after substituting the subscript L with H), optimal bids and scores are
b1 = b2 = θL + ψ(q), so that scores are S1 = S2 = θL + ψ(q) + h. The two firms tie and the
project is awarded randomly. The players’ (expected, in case of the buyer) payoffs are
pi1 = 0; pi2 = 0; Eu = v + q − θL − ψ(q). (B-2)
Lemma B-2. Assume h1 = h > 0 and h2 = 0; assume also that firm 1 bids anticipating to deliver
quality q1 = 0 and firm 2 bids anticipating to deliver quality q2 > 0. Then
i) when LH and
i.i) h < ∆θ+ ψ(q), optimal bids are b1 = θH + ψ(q)− h and b2 = θH + ψ(q), so that scores
are S1 = θH + ψ(q) and S2 = θH + ψ(q). Firm 1 wins and players’ payoffs are
pi1 = ∆θ + ψ(q)− h; pi2 = 0; u = v − θH − ψ(q) + h; (B-3)
i.ii) h = ∆θ + ψ(q), optimal bids are b1 = θL and b2 = θH + ψ(q), so that scores are
S1 = θH + ψ(q) and S2 = θH + ψ(q). The two firms tie and the project is awarded
randomly. The players’ (expected, in case of the buyer) payoffs are
pi1 = 0; pi2 = 0; Eu = v − θL + 12(q − h); (B-4)
B-1
i.iii) ∆θ+ψ(q) < h, optimal bids are b1 = θL and b2 = θL+h, so that scores are S1 = θL+h
and S2 = θL + h. Firm 2 wins and players’ payoffs are
pi1 = 0; pi2 = h−∆θ − ψ(q); u = v + q − θL − h; (B-5)
ii) when HL and
i.i) h < ψ(q)−∆θ, optimal bids are b1 = θL + ψ(q)− h and b2 = θL + ψ(q), so that scores
are S1 = θL + ψ(q) and S2 = θL + ψ(q). Firm 1 wins and players’ payoffs are
pi1 = ψ(q)−∆θ − h; pi2 = 0; u = v − θL − ψ(q) + h; (B-6)
i.ii) h = ψ(q) − ∆θ, optimal bids are b1 = θH and b2 = θL + ψ(q), so that scores are
S1 = θH + h and S2 = θL + ψ(q). The two firms tie and the project is awarded
randomly. The players’ (expected, in case of the buyer) payoffs are
pi1 = 0; pi2 = 0; Eu = v +
1
2(q − h); (B-7)
i.iii) ψ(q) −∆θ < h, optimal bids are b1 = θH and b2 = θH + h, so that S1 = θH + h and
S2 = θH + h. Firm 2 wins and players’ payoffs are
pi1 = 0; pi2 = h+ ∆θ − ψ(q); u = v + q − θH − h; (B-8)
iii) when LL (or HH, after substituting the subscript L with H) and
iii.i) h < ψ(q), optimal bids are b1 = θL + ψ(q)− h and b2 = θL + ψ(q), so that scores are
S1 = θL + ψ(q) and S2 = θL + ψ(q). Firm 1 wins and players’ payoffs are
pi1 = ψ(q)− h; pi2 = 0; u = v − θL − ψ(q) + h; (B-9)
iii.ii) h = ψ(q), optimal bids are b1 = θL and b2 = θL+ψ(q), so that scores are S1 = θL+h
and S2 = θL + ψ(q). The two firms tie and the project is awarded randomly. The
players’ (expected, in case of the buyer) payoffs are
pi1 = 0; pi2 = 0; Eu = v − θL + 12 (q − h); (B-10)
iii.iii) ψ(q) < h, optimal bids are b1 = θL and b2 = θL + h, so that scores are S1 = θL + h
and S2 = θL + h. Firm j wins and players’ payoffs are
pi1 = 0; pi2 = h− ψ(q); u = v + q − θL − h. (B-11)
B-2
B-2 Equilibrium with stick and carrot strategies and T = 1 or
T = 2
This Section provides the full results summarised in footnote 32 regarding the existence, under
some parametric conditions, of an explicit discount factor strictly lower than 1 for low values of
T ◦, the length of the punishment for a deviating firm.
Proposition B-1. Assume the buyer is committed to her strategy. When T ◦ = 1 or T ◦ = 2,
provided that h ≥ ψ(q∗) and some parametric conditions hold, the strategy profile sB(h◦, q∗, 0, T ◦)
and si(q
∗) (with i = 1, 2) defines a self-enforcing RPC whenever the players’ discount factor is
higher than a critical value strictly lower than 1.
In particular, the strategy profile sB(h
◦, q∗, 0, T ◦) and si(q∗) (with i = 1, 2) defines a self-
enforcing RPC
























∗) ∈ (0,min{∆θ, h◦ −∆θ}],√
[B(h◦−ψ(q∗))]2+4Bψ(q∗)(h◦−ψ)−B(h◦−ψ(q∗))
B(h◦−ψ(q∗)) if ψ(q
∗) ∈ (max{0, h◦ −∆θ},∆θ] .
(B-13)
where B ≡ β(1− β).
Proof. Take the case T ◦ = 1. Substituting T ◦ = 1 in (A-8) and rearranging gives
piC1 (0, 0) + δEpi
C
1 (0, 0) ≥ piD1 (0, 0) + δEpiP1 (h◦, 0); (B-14)
solving it w.r.to δ gives
δ ≥ pi
D
1 (0, 0)− piC1 (0, 0)
EpiC1 (0, 0)− EpiP1 (h◦, 0)
. (B-15)
Similarly, substituting T ◦ = 1 in (A-10) and rearranging gives
piC2 (h
◦, 0) + δEpiC2 (0, 0) ≥ piD2 (h◦, 0) + δEpiP2 (0, h◦); (B-16)




◦, 0)− piC2 (h◦, 0)
EpiC2 (0, 0)− EpiP2 (0, h◦)
. (B-17)
Following Lemma A-1 and equations (A-2), (A-3) and (A-7), when ψ∗ + ∆θ ≤ h◦, inequality
(B-15) becomes δ ≥ ψ∗B∆θ ≡ δα; when instead ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ψ∗ + ∆θ, inequality (B-15) becomes
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δ ≥ ψ∗B(h◦−ψ∗) ≡ δβ. On the other hand, when ψ∗ + ∆θ ≤ h◦, inequality (B-17) becomes δ ≥ δα;
when instead ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ψ∗ + ∆θ, inequality (B-17) becomes δ ≥ h◦−∆θB(h◦−ψ∗) ≡ δγ .
To establish the result, first notice that δγ < δβ. Hence, both (B-15) and (B-17) hold if δ ≥ δα
when ψ∗ + ∆θ ≤ h◦, and if δ ≥ δβ when ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ψ∗ + ∆θ. Notice also that δα < 1 when
ψ∗ < B∆θ, while δβ < 1 when ψ∗ < h◦ B1+B .
Take now the case T ◦ = 2. Substituting T ◦ = 2 in (A-8) and rearranging gives
piC1 (0, 0) + δEpi
C
1 (0, 0) + δ
2EpiC1 (0, 0)− [piD1 (0, 0) + δEpiP1 (h◦, 0) + δ2EpiP1 (h◦, 0)] ≥ 0 (B-18)






1 (0, 0)− piC1 (0, 0)]− E1
2E1
, (B-19)
where E1 ≡ EpiC1 (0, 0)−EpiP1 (h◦, 0). Since, by construction, E1 > 0 and piD1 (0, 0) > piC1 (0, 0), only





1 (0, 0)− piC1 (0, 0)]− E1
2E1
. (B-20)
Substituting T ◦ = 2 in (A-10) and rearranging gives
piC2 (h
◦, 0) + δEpiC2 (h
◦, 0) + δ2EpiC2 (0, 0)− [piD2 (h◦, 0) + δEpiP2 (h◦, h◦) + δ2EpiP2 (0, h◦)] ≥ 0 (B-21)







◦, 0)− piC2 (h◦, 0)]− E2
2R2
. (B-22)
where E2 ≡ EpiC2 (h◦, 0) − EpiP2 (h◦, h◦), R2 ≡ EpiP2 (0, h◦) − EpiC2 (0, 0). Since, by construction,
E2 > 0, R2 < 0 and pi
D
2 (h
◦, 0) > piC2 (h◦, 0), only one value in (B-22) is positive and we can







◦, 0)− piC2 (h◦, 0)]− E2
2R2
. (B-23)




(B∆θ)2 + 4Bψ∗∆θ − B∆θ
]
≡ δµ; when instead ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ψ∗+∆θ, then inequality (B-20)
becomes δ ≥ 12B(h◦−ψ∗)
[√
(B(h◦ − ψ∗))2 + 4Bψ(h◦ − ψ∗)−B(h◦ −ψ∗)
]
≡ δρ. On the other hand,
when ψ∗ + ∆θ ≤ h◦, then inequality (B-23) becomes δ ≥ 12B∆θ
[√
(h◦ − ψ∗ − B∆θ)2 + 4Bψ∗∆θ −
(h◦ − ψ∗ − B∆θ)
]
≡ δν ; when instead ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ψ∗ + ∆θ, then inequality (B-23) becomes
δ ≥ 12B(h◦−ψ∗)
[√




To establish the result, first notice that δµ > δν , and δρ > δσ. Hence, both (B-20) and (B-23)
hold if δ ≥ δµ when ψ∗ + ∆θ ≤ h and δ ≥ δρ when ψ∗ ≤ h◦ < ψ∗ + ∆θ. Also, δµ, δρ < 1.
B-3 A cooperative equilibrium under asymmetric information:
The case of debarment
In this section, we remove the assumption of symmetric information between firms on (fixed)
production costs and consider the case of privately informed firms. More precisely, each firm
i = 1, 2 in each period t = 0, ...,∞ learns its own fixed cost, but only knows that firm j’s cost,
j = 3− i, is equal to θL (θH , respectively) with probability β (1−β, respectively). In what follows
we prove that a pair of RPCs enforcing quality q∗ still exists when the buyer can commit to a
very high level of handicap which is equivalent to a de facto debarment of the cheating firm(s)
from the procurement market. More precisely, we show the existence of such RPCs for all levels
of handicap h ≥ h, where h ≡ ψ(q∗) + ∆θ.
We extend the trigger strategies of Section 4.3.1 to the case of asymmetric information by
introducing strategies sB(h, q
∗), si,L(q∗) and si,H(q∗) that are similar to sB(hC , q∗) and si(q∗)
except for the restriction on the level of handicap and for the firm’s strategy being type-dependent.
Define ψ(q∗) ≡ ψ∗.
Proposition B-2. Assume that the buyer commits to h◦ ≥ h. Let β ≡ ∆θh−ψ∗ and
δasy ≡ ψ
∗
ψ∗ + β (1− β) ∆θ .
Then, if β ≥ β and ψ∗ > ∆θ, and provided that δ ≥ δasy, the strategies profile sB(h◦, q∗), si,L(q∗)
and si,H(q
∗), i = 1, 2, defines a self-enforcing RPC whereby the project is awarded in each period
to the most efficient firm, which delivers quality q∗.











where, provided that the other players follow their grim trigger strategies, piCi (pi
D
i , respectively) are
the profits that firm i makes in period t when sticking to (deviating from) its strategy si(q
∗); EpiCi
(EpiPi , respectively) are the expected single-period profits that it makes from period t+1 onwards
when sticking to (being punished after a deviation from) strategy si(q











The string of lemmata below will pin down the values of the relevant expressions in B-24.
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Lemma B-3. In the constituent game, if both types of either firm bid to deliver quality q∗
then type θH ’s equilibrium payoff is zero whereas type θL’s equilibrium payoff is (1− β) ∆θ.
Proof. Since both types bid by taking into account that they will deliver quality q∗, bidder
i’s ‘anticipated’ production costs will be ci(θL, 0, ψ
∗) = θL + ψ∗ when its type is θL and
ci(θH , 0, ψ
∗) = θH + ψ∗ when its type is θH , with i = 1, 2. Given that the type space is
discrete, we can immediately apply Maskin and Riley (1985) to derive the equilibrium strategies
and payoffs. That is, type θH of either firm will bid θH + ψ
∗ with probability 1, whereas
type θL will randomize according to the distribution function F (·) defined over the support
[b, b] = [θL + ψ
∗ + (1 − β)∆θ, θH + ψ∗]. More precisely, the probability that type θL will bid
at most with bL, F (bL), has to satisfy the following indifference condition
(bL − θL − ψ∗)[(1− β) + β(1− F (bL))] = (1− β)∆θ, (B-25)
where the value of type θL’s expected payoff, (1− β)∆θ, is derived by imposing the boundary
condition F (θH + ψ
∗) = 1. Then
F (bL) =
(bL − θL − ψ∗)− (1− β)∆θ
β(bL − θL − ψ∗) . (B-26)
It is immediate to verify that the equilibrium distribution function is monotonically increasing
over the relevant support and that either type has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
bidding strategy.
Lemma B-4. Take any constituent game after bidder j gets handicapped. Suppose that bidder
i keeps adhering to its strategy si(q
∗). If
β ≥ β ≡ ∆θ
h◦ − ψ∗ ,
there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where type θL and θH of bidder j bid θL and θH
respectively; and both types of bidder i = 3− j bid θL + h◦. At equilibrium, bidder i is selected
and delivers quality q∗.
Proof. Suppose bidder j’s type bid according to the stated strategies and consider type θL of
bidder i. A bid equal to θL + h
◦ yields a profit of h◦ − ψ∗. Raising the bid to θH + h◦ yields
(1− β) (∆θ + h◦ − ψ∗) since type θL of bidder i would only defeat the high type of bidder j.
Then
h◦ − ψ∗ ≥ (1− β) (∆θ + h◦ − ψ∗)⇔ β
1− β ≥
∆θ
h◦ − ψ∗ ,
which is fulfilled given the assumption on β. Consider now type θH of bidder i. A bid equal
to θL + h
◦ yields an expected profit of h◦ − ψ∗ −∆θ. A bid of θH + h◦ yields (1− β) (h− ψ∗)
B-6
as it only defeats type θH of bidder j. Then
h◦ − ψ∗ −∆θ ≥ (1− β) (h◦ − ψ∗)⇔ β ≥ ∆θ
h◦ − ψ∗ ,
which is again fulfilled given the assumption on β. Given bidder i’s strategy profile, bidder j
does not have any incentive to deviate.
Lemma B-3 and B-4 allow us to derive the value of EpiCi and Epi
P
i in B-24, which are equal to
β(1−β)∆θ and 0, respectively. We are now left with finding the highest possible value of piDi −piCi
that will determine the critical threshold of the discount factor for the strategies sB(h
C , q∗) and
si(q
∗) to be part of an equilibrium at any t ≥ 0. Generally, this difference will be type-dependent,
thus only the higher value will matter for the critical threshold. The lemma below provides the
last step of the proof.
Lemma B-5. Let ψ∗ > ∆θ, and suppose that at any t ≥ 0 firm j = 1, 2 bids according to its
cooperative strategy sj(q
∗). Then firm i’s (i 6= j) highest (static) net gain from deviating from
si(q
∗) is equal to ψ∗.
Proof. Consider first type θH of bidder i. Given the strategies adopted by player j’s types,
type θH of bidder i has two relevant deviations, namely to bid either (slightly below) θH +ψ
∗
or θL + ψ
∗ + (1− β)∆θ. The first option yields an expected payoff of (1− β)ψ∗, whereas the
second yields ψ∗ − β∆θ > (1 − β)ψ∗ given the assumption on ψ∗. It is also immediate that
any bid in the interval (b, b) = (θL + ψ
∗ + (1 − β)∆θ, θH + ψ∗) will yield an expected payoff
strictly lower than ψ∗− β∆θ, which also represents type θH ’s highest net gain from deviating
from the cooperative strategy. Consider now type θL of firm i. The most profitable is simply
to bid (slightly below) θL + ψ
∗ + (1 − β)∆θ with probability 1 and not deliver quality. This
strategy yields a (static) net gain from deviation equal to ψ∗.
Lemma B-5 shows that at each t ≥ 0 it is type θL of firm i which has the highest net gain from
deviating from the cooperative strategy, implying that the relevant value of the difference piDi −piCi
is equal to ψ∗. Consequently, at time t = 0 an RPC is sustained by the strategies sB(h, q∗), si,L(q∗)
and si,H(q
∗) if and only if δ ≥ δasy.
For low and intermediate values of h the characterisation of the stage-game equilibrium bids
becomes more convoluted. Indeed, for sufficiently low values of h the following chain of inequalities
may hold:
ci(θL, 0, q
∗) < cj(θL, h, q∗) < ci(θH , 0, q∗) < cj(θH , h, q∗), i = 1, 2; j = 3− i.
To our knowledge, Doni and Menicucci (2013) are the first ones to characterize Bayes-Nash equi-
libria for first- and second-price (selling) two-player auction with discrete valuations even when
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the latter ‘overlap’ as in the case depicted by the above inequalities.35 This paper also shows
that the mixed strategy equilibria involve players using different cumulative distribution functions
depending on the absolute difference between players’ valuations. In other terms, the equilibrium
distribution functions depend upon the differences between the terms above. Thus extending our
model to encompass fully asymmetric information between firms would result in complicating
quite considerably the equilibrium characterization of the stage game (but only once a deviation
from cooperation is observed).
35Doni, N. and D. Menicucci, 2013. “Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations”. The
B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 13(1).
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